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Abstract 
This paper is devoted to defining the role of the central bank in ensuring banking and financial stability. The 
main purpose of the study is to assess the direction and strength of the impact of central bank independence in 
terms of its individual aspects on the parameters of banking and financial stability for different groups of 
countries. Systematization of literature sources and the results of existing empirical research has shown that 
the expected effects of increasing the independence of the central bank are to improve banking and financial 
stability. For the study, a sample of statistical data for 10 developed and 10 developing countries for the period 
1991-2012 was formed. The methodological basis of the study were the tools of panel regression modeling 
with fixed effects with Stata software use. The article presents the results of empirical analysis, which showed 
that the independence of the central bank is an important factor in ensuring banking stability. At the same time, 
the impact on financial stability has not been conclusively confirmed. The study empirically confirms and 
theoretically proves that the stage of development of the country determines the strength of such influence. 
Thus, developed countries generally show closer links between central bank independence and banking and 
financial stability, which in most cases are directly dependent, while developing countries have less lasting 
effects. The results of the analysis of the links between certain aspects of central bank independence and the 
level of banking and financial stability are of great practical value. The results of the study create a scientific 
basis for substantiating the sequence of actions aimed at strengthening the independence of the central bank. 
Thus, in developing countries, the focus should be on defining and prioritizing central bank goals, while 
developed countries should take a deeper approach to this issue and ensure the independence of monetary 
policy and financial independence of the central bank.  
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Introduction 
The growing risks of instability of the global and national economies, the development of their financialization, 
the strengthening of capital movements and the emergence of new forms of financial cooperation necessitate 
increased efficiency of regulatory policy in the financial sector. The negative experience of political and 
economic crises testifies to the priority of ensuring the independence of the central bank as the main 
prerequisite for its effective operation in regulating the banking system. World practice has shown that the 
independence of the central bank has a close direct relationship not only with price stability, but also with the 
stability of the financial system as a whole, increasing the ability of the state to withstand crisis processes. At 
the same time, it is important not only to determine the relationship between the independence of the central 
bank and the level of banking and financial stability, but also to justify the channels of influence of the central 
bank on the stabilization of the banking system. At the same time, it is expected to obtain various effects 
depending on the initial level of independence of the central bank, its dynamics and macroeconomic conditions 
of the country's development. 
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Literature review 
Ensuring the trend of increasing the quality of central bank governance in terms of maintaining price stability 
remain in the spotlight for a long period of time. Central bank reforms have raised expectations about the 
positive impact of central bank independence on this task (Crowe and Meade, 2007). Cristea and Lupua (2014) 
analyze the significant role of financial stability among the goals of the central bank. At the same time, there 
is a conflict of goals between price stability and financial stability. In this regard, it is a subject of scientific 
interest to study the impact of central bank independence on price and financial stability in terms of assessing 
the possibility of achieving them simultaneously. The results of the assessment of the impact of central bank 
independence on the stability of banks and the banking system, measured by the level of systemic risk obtained 
by Andrieș and Podpiera (2018), showed that increasing the independence of central banks is associated with 
a decrease in the level of systemic risk. At the same time, countries with a higher level of development and a 
more competitive banking system show a larger effect. Sheppard (2008) justifies that the independence of the 
central bank has different effects for developed and developing countries. Moreover, each central bank has its 
own specifics, which determine the features of the impact of its independence on the achievement of certain 
goals. On the other hand, studies conducted on a sample of developed and developing countries have shown 
that increasing central bank independence increases the volatility of the securities market proportionally. These 
effects are observed for all components of central bank independence (Afshari and Daraei, 2018). Balls et al 
(2018) not only revealed the differences of effects obtained due to central banks’ independence growth in 
advanced and developing economies, but also define the prospects of central banks independence development 
taking into account financial crisis consequences influence. Based on this, we determine that in the face of 
continuing threats of financial crises, the study of the relationship between central bank independence and the 
level of banking and financial stability in the context of the formation of preventive anti-crisis policy of the 
central bank becomes relevant. 
Methodology and Results 
Set of factor variables was formed based on the central bank's independence index developed by Cukierman 
et al. (1992). It is based on the principle of prioritizing price stability for the central bank and, accordingly, its 
ability to make any decisions aimed at its observance, even in the event of a conflict of interest with other 
authorities and other political goals. This index allows measuring the following aspects to be considered in the 
evaluation process: 1) peculiarities of appointment and dismissal of the chairman of the central bank, term of 
his powers; 2) policy aimed at resolving the conflict of interests between the central bank and the executive, 
the relationship of the central bank with the budget process; 3) main goals of the central bank; 4) restrictions 
on the possibility of direct and indirect lending to the public sector by the central bank. A database generated 
by Garriga A. C. (2016) containing the following variables was used for the calculations: 
 CBI – total value of central bank's independence index calculated accordingly to Cukierman et al. (1992) 
methodology; 
 CBI_CEO – value of sub-index of central bank chief executive officer independence; 
 CBI_Goal – value of sub-index of central bank goals definition (price stability priority); 
 CBI_Policy – value of sub-index of central bank's independence in forming of their monetary policy; 
 CBI_Lending – value of sub-index of government lending limitations. 
Banking and financial stability indicators were selected from the The World Bank Global Financial Development 
database. There are 3 banking stability indicators: 
 Z-score – bank Z-score, indicator of the probability of default of a country's banking system; 
 Non-performing loans – bank non-performing loans to gross loans, %); 
 Capitalization – bank regulatory capital to risk-weighted assets, %. 
To measure financial stability the indicator of Stock price volatility (the average of the 360-day volatility of the 
national stock market index) was chosen. 
In addition, a list of control variables was formed to build econometric models for assessing the impact of central 
bank independence on financial and banking stability: 
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 Concentration – bank concentration measured as a ratio of three largest banks data to all banks data, %  
 Debt – total value of outstanding international debt issues both public and private, as a share of GDP, %. 
 GDP – annual value of GDP growth, %. 
Given the low variability of the level of independence of the central bank within one country, it is advisable to 
conduct empirical calculations on the basis of panel data. For this purpose, a statistical sample of data for 20 
countries of the world for the period 1991-2012 was formed. The selected countries can be conditionally 
divided into 2 groups: developed countries (United States, Canada, United Kingdom, Ireland, Netherlands, 
Belgium, France, Switzerland, Spain, Germany) and developing countries (Ukraine, Latvia, Lithuania, 
Estonia, Poland, Hungary, Czech Republic, Slovak Republic, Bulgaria, Romania). In the next stages, 
calculations will be made both for the general sample of countries and within certain groups. This will assess 
the impact of the country's development stage on the use of the central bank's potential for independence in 
ensuring financial and banking stability. Panel regression modeling tools using Stat software were selected for 
assessment. Therefore, at the first stage we summarize the descriptive statistics on the selected factor, 
dependent and control variables (Table 1). These data indicate a number of differences in the summarized 
values of the study variables for the two groups of countries. Thus, developed countries have a higher average 
level of central bank independence index and lower average its volatility compared to developing countries. 
In terms of individual sub-indices, this trend is observed for almost all indicators, except for government 
lending limits, which show the best volatility and mean values in developing countries. 
Table 1. The summarizing statistics on research variables within developed and developing countries 
Variable Developed countries Developing countries 
Obs Std. Dev. Mean Min Max Obs Std. Dev. Mean Min Max 
CBI 220 2.486464 0.7423753 0.533 3.183 214 2.83029 0.63285 1.183 3.517 
CBI_CEO 220 0.5789409 0.1213984 0.25 0.83 214 0.676626 0.1197733 0.25 0.77 
CBI_Goal  220 0.5290909 0.2418896 0 1 214 0.689719 0.1507008 0.4 1 
CBI_Policy 220 0.6185727 0.3859866 0 1 214 0.767504 0.2094364 0.282 1 
CBI_Lending 220 0.7596 0.2795528 0.166 1 214 0.696303 0.3555288 0 1 
Z-score 170 14.00728 6.847651 0.0557 38.595 170 7.70914 3.536214 1.013 18.57 
Non-performing 
loans 
147 2.786846 2.839029 0.3 24.987 135 8.5012 8.132887 0.2 35.8 
Capitalization 149 13.13496 1.915185 10.2 19.304 137 15.3406 4.791875 6.6 41.8 
Stock price 
volatility 
213 19.08177 7.351045 7.822 45.658 130 24.4702 9.69059 10.37 57.07 
Concentration 170 66.4774 18.95209 20.18 100 170 65.3986 16.77651 26.98 100 
Debt 217 43.71932 38.94331 2.345 223.21 178 9.96733 9.226201 0.669 39.77 
GDP 210 1.588097 2.324949 -6.334 9.7911 200 3.40706 5.579287 -22.5 13.08 
Source: compiled by author. 
On the other hand, the stability indicators of the banking and financial system reflect higher risks of instability 
for developing countries compared to developed countries. At the same time, the values of control variables 
indicate the prospects for a positive impact of macroeconomic conditions on banking and financial stability in 
developing countries. So, we move on to the next step, which is to determine the relationships between the 
studied variables. At this stage, the model specification should be determined. The Hausman test showed that 
a regression model with fixed effects is more adequate for the given statistics. The results of the assessment of 
the generalized for developed and developing countries, the impact of central bank independence on banking 
stability, measured by the bank Z-score indicator, are presented in table 2. 
Table 2. The results of multiple panel regression modeling of the impact of central banks’ independence on bank 
Z-score 
Variable Coef. Std. Err. t P>|t| Lowest 95% Highest 95% 
CBI 1.079535** 0.479194 2.25 0.025 0.1366626 2.022407 
Concentration -0.0045538 0.0162917 -0.28 0.780 -0.0366097 0.027502 
Debt -0.0284821*** 0.0076333 -3.73 0.000 -0.0435016 -0.0134627 
GDP -0.0047939 0.0446411 -0.11 0.915 -0.0926306 0.0830428 
Constant 9.058376*** 1.85529 4.88 0.000 5.407868 12.70888 
Notes:  level of statistical significance at one of the confidence intervals: *** – 99%, ** – 95%, * – 90%. 
Source: compiled by author. 
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This table shows that the growth of central bank independence has a positive impact on maintaining banking 
stability, which is statistically significant. It should be noted that among the control variables there is a 
statistically significant effect only for the parameter of international public debt, the increase in the relative 
level of which causes a reduction in the stability of the banking system. At the same time, it is important to 
detail the results obtained. For this purpose, additional calculations were performed to assess the impact of the 
central bank's independence index and its sub-indices in terms of the two groups of countries studied, the 
results of which are shown in table. 3. Additional calculations show that in developed countries the impact of 
central bank independence on bank Z-score is positive and statistically significant, and its quantitative level is 
significantly higher than previous calculations. At the same time, in developing countries, the level of bank Z-
score is not influenced by central bank independence. 
Table 3. The results of multiple panel regression modeling of the impact of central banks’ independence on 
bank Z-score within developed and developing countries 
Variable Developed countries Developing countries 
Coef. Std. Err. t P>|t| Coef. Std. Err. t P>|t| 
CBI 2.407289** 0.9526951 2.53 0.013 1427816 .4169192 0.34 0.732 
CBI_CEO 1.105872 6.486793 0.17 0.865 -3.07171 2.46507 -1.25 0.215 
CBI_Goal  2.016903 1.588888 1.27 0.206 2.656257* 1.587554 1.67 0.096 
CBI_Policy 4.802229** 2.10887 2.28 0.024 1.185159 1.357216 0.87 0.384 
CBI_Lending 3.213729 2.152866 1.49 0.138 -0.1354016 0.6233826 -0.22 0.828 
Notes:  level of statistical significance at one of the confidence intervals: *** – 99%, ** – 95%, * – 90%. 
Source: compiled by author. 
At the same time, the results obtained in the study of the impact of central bank independence sub-indices are 
interesting. We can conclude that for developed countries the most important stimulus for Z-score growth is 
the independence of the central bank in choosing monetary policy instruments, while for developed countries 
it is important to define in legislation the priority of price stability among the goals of the central bank. The 
next important indicator of banking stability is banks ’non-performing loans. According to Table 4, the growth 
of central bank independence provides a significant reduction in the level of non-performing loans in the 
banking system. At the same time, GDP growth is a factor that stimulates the improvement of the structure of 
banks' loan portfolios, while the concentration of the banking system and external debt, on the contrary, worsen 
the quality of loans in the assets of commercial banks and, accordingly, threaten banking stability. 
Table 4. The results of multiple panel regression modeling of the impact of central banks’ independence on 
banks’ non-performing loans 
Variable Coef. Std. Err. t P>|t| Lowest 95% Highest 95% 
CBI -3.185853** 1.3657  -2.33 0.020 -5.875241 -0.4964643 
Concentration 0.1221159*** 0.0345 3.54 0.000 0.0541247 0.190107 
Debt 0.0340718** 0.0139057 2.45 0.015 0.0066881 0.0614555 
GDP -0.3600594*** 0.0814026 -4.42 0.000 -0.5203604 -0.1997584 
Constant 6.558788 4.648583 1.41 0.159 -2.595377 15.71295 
Notes:  level of statistical significance at one of the confidence intervals: *** – 99%, ** – 95%, * – 90%. 
Source: compiled by author. 
The results obtained at the next stage of the study (Table 5) show that in developing countries, the 
independence of the central bank does not have a significant impact on the level of non-performing loans. At 
the same time, the experience of developed countries shows that the independence of the central bank is an 
important factor limiting the level of non-performing loans both at the index level and in setting central bank 
goals and restrictions on government lending. At the same time, the independence of the CEO of the central 
bank, on the contrary, is a factor that leads to an increase in non-performing loans. 
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Table 5. The results of multiple panel regression modeling of the impact of central banks’ independence on 
banks’ non-performing loans within developed and developing countries 
Variable Developed countries Developing countries 
Coef. Std. Err. t P>|t| Coef. Std. Err. t P>|t| 
CBI -3.736438*** 1.198663 -3.12 0.002 -2.207615 2.131109 -1.04 0.302 
CBI_CEO 19.49897*** 5.882204 3.31 0.001 13.53035 11.65434 1.16 0.248 
CBI_Goal  -3.873982*** 1.225142 -3.16 0.002 7.156109 7.303687 0.98 0.329 
CBI_Policy -12.33771 16.23858 -0.76 0.449 -6.21742 6.805232 -0.91 0.363 
CBI_Lending -21.15037*** 6.25826 -3.38 0.001 -4.11422 2.637188 -1.56 0.121 
Notes:  level of statistical significance at one of the confidence intervals: *** – 99%, ** – 95%, * – 90%. 
Source: compiled by author. 
The last studied indicator of the stability of the banking system is the level of its capitalization. The results presented 
in Table 6 showed that the growth of central bank independence may lead to a decrease in the level of capitalization 
of the banking system. At the same time, GDP growth is a factor that deepens such a decline, and the concentration 
of the banking system and external debt can stimulate an increase in the level of bank capitalization. 
Table 6. The results of multiple panel regression modeling of the impact of central banks’ independence on 
banks’ capitalization 
Variable Coef. Std. Err. t P>|t| Lowest 95% Highest 95% 
CBI -1.838874** 0.7747641 -2.37 0.018 -3.364458 -0.31329 
Concentration 0.0842939*** 0.0191814 4.39 0.000 0.046524 0.1220639 
Debt 0.360822*** 0.0078548 4.59 0.000 0.0206153 0.0515491 
GDP -0.1354586*** 0.0459216 -2.95 0.003 -0.2258826 -0.0450347 
Constant 13.07774*** 2.627513 4.98 0.000 7.903916 18.25156 
Notes:  level of statistical significance at one of the confidence intervals: *** – 99%, ** – 95%, * – 90%. 
Source: compiled by author. 
Note that in terms of developed countries, the independence of the central bank has a positive impact on the 
stability of the banking system, as measured by the indicator of its capitalization (Table 7). Stimulators of 
strengthening the banking system are also well-defined goals of the central bank, its independence in the choice 
of monetary policy instruments. On the other hand, increasing independence from the government in the 
appointment and performance of central bank CEO may create the preconditions for deteriorating bank 
capitalization. At the same time, developing countries are showing a decline in the level of bank capitalization, 
both with the general growth of central bank independence and with the strengthening of such aspects as the 
independence of monetary policy and restrictions on government lending. At the same time, the defined goals 
of monetary policy create incentives to improve the capitalization of banks. 
Table 7. The results of multiple panel regression modeling of the impact of central banks’ independence on 
banks’ capitalization within developed and developing countries 
Variable Developed countries Developing countries 
Coef. Std. Err. t P>|t| Coef. Std. Err. t P>|t| 
CBI 2.07566** 0.8690843 2.39 0.018 -4.787093*** 0.9173467 -5.22 0.000 
CBI_CEO -8.305862* 4.314085 -1.93 0.056 -1.864826 5.55219 -0.34 0.738 
CBI_Goal  2.057129** 0.890294 2.31 0.022 8.884472** 3.388519 2.62 0.010 
CBI_Policy 35.34626*** 11.23329 3.15 0.002 -15.06677*** 2.936336 -5.13 0.000 
CBI_Lending 6.758544 4.622827 1.46 0.146 -6.1964*** 1.132128 -5.47 0.000 
Notes:  level of statistical significance at one of the confidence intervals: *** – 99%, ** – 95%, * – 90%. 
Source: compiled by author. 
The next stage of assessing the impact of central bank independence on financial stability, as measured by the 
volatility of the securities market (Table 8), showed no statistically significant effect on the overall sample of 
countries. At the same time, GDP growth creates conditions for financial stabilization, and the growth of 
international debt leads to instability. 
Table 8. The results of multiple panel regression modeling of the impact of central banks’ independence on 
stock price volatility 
Variable Coef. Std. Err. t P>|t| Lowest 95% Highest 95% 
CBI 1.075868 1.749634 0.61 0.539 -2.368907 4.520644 
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Table 8 (cont.). The results of multiple panel regression modeling of the impact of central banks’ independence 
on stock price volatility 
Concentration 0.0458482 0.0480712 0.95 0.341 -0.0487972 0.1404935 
Debt 0.0524759*** 0.0191698 2.74 0.007 0.0147333 0.0902186 
GDP -0.7967649*** 0.1224555 -6.51 0.000 -1.037862 -0.5556677 
Constant 16.28835*** 5.732582 2.84 0.005 5.001731 27.57498 
Notes:  level of statistical significance at one of the confidence intervals: *** – 99%, ** – 95%, * – 90%. 
Source: compiled by author. 
At the level of developed countries, an inverse relationship was found between central bank independence and 
financial stability (Table 9).  
Table 9. The results of multiple panel regression modeling of the impact of central banks’ independence on 
stock price volatility within developed and developing countries 
Variable Developed countries Developing countries 
Coef. Std. Err. t P>|t| Coef. Std. Err. t P>|t| 
CBI 3.160633* 1.705109 1.85 0.066 -3.369553 3.722272 -0.91 0.367 
CBI_CEO -5.725785 11.46937 -0.50 0.618 -8.935441 21.82418 -0.41 0.683 
CBI_Goal  -1.801003 2.690098 -0.67 0.504 14.88764* 7.96466 1.87 0.064 
CBI_Policy 8.577115** 3.497551 2.45 0.015 15.42044 10.38853 1.48 0.141 
CBI_Lending 9.361643** 3.635018 2.58 0.011 -8.549138 3.719751 -2.30 0.023 
Notes:  level of statistical significance at one of the confidence intervals: *** – 99%, ** – 95%, * – 90%. 
Source: compiled by author. 
Such dependence is primarily determined by the action of such components of the index as the independence 
of monetary policy and government lending. On the other hand, developing countries showed a statistically 
significant effect only for the impact of central bank objectives on the stability of the financial system. 
Conclusions, Discussion and Recommendations 
The study showed that the independence of the central bank is an important factor in ensuring banking stability. 
At the same time, the impact on financial stability has not been conclusively confirmed. It should be noted that 
the stage of development of the country determines the strength of such influence. Thus, developed countries 
generally show closer links between central bank independence and banking and financial stability, which in 
most cases are directly dependent, while developing countries have less lasting effects. 
It is interesting to analyze the relationship between certain aspects of central bank independence and the level 
of banking and financial stability. Thus, for developed countries, the most important aspects of central bank 
independence in the context of banking stability are the goals of the central bank, its independence in choosing 
monetary policy instruments and, in some cases, limitations of government credit. At the same time, the 
increase in the independence of the CEO often leads to the opposite effect, causing deterioration in the values 
of the studied indicators. At the same time, for developing countries, the most important thing is to prioritize 
the central bank's goals. Thus, the study not only confirmed the positive role of central bank independence in 
ensuring banking and financial stability, but also justified the sequence of actions aimed at strengthening the 
independence of the central bank in this context. Thus, in developing countries, the focus should be on defining 
and prioritizing central bank goals, while developed countries should take a deeper approach to this issue and 
ensure the independence of monetary policy instruments and financial independence of the central bank. 
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